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It is noteworthy that, in general, a certain similarity between Kant’s ethics and 
utilitarianism or consequentialism is, especially, considered by some utilitarians 
or consequentialists (such as David Cummiskey and Richard M. Hare)1, while 
many neo-Kantians (such as Warner A. Wick or Christine M. Korsgaard)2 refuse 
such reasoning. Other neo-Kantians, who admit the existence of this aspect in 
Kant’s ethics, tried to mitigate the impracticability of its ethical concepts and 
eliminate criticism for its lack of interest in the real moral problems of man 
(Otfried Höffe, Jeffrie G. Murphy, Andreas Reath, Thomas E. Hill, Jr., etc.)3. 
I think that Kant’s moral ideal expressed through the Categorical Imperative 
has all the features of the enlightened maximalist and perfectionist moral ideal,4 
despite the fact that, in principle, it cannot be equated with Kant’s  motives 
towards perfectionism and, for example, utilitarian motives leading to the 
principle of maximization. Both theories seek to maximize but are based 
on different criteria and different themes. Utilitarianism seeks to maximize 
the happiness of the maximum number of people (Bentham, the Greatest 
Happiness Principle) on the basis of the assessment of the chances of achieving 
the maximum possible utility, pleasure or satisfaction of desires. Kant seeks 
to achieve this enlightened ideal based on good (moral) motives that lie 
in accepting, a  priori, moral law and the maxims that it entails.5 Maxims are 
1  Hare, R. M.: Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981; Cum-
miskey, D.: Kantian Consequentialism. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
2  Wick, W. A.: Kant’s Moral Philosophy. In: Kant, I.: Ethical Philosophy. Indianapolis & Cambridge: 
Hackett, 1983, pp. xi–lxii; Korsgaard, Ch. M.: Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjec-
tivity of Reason: Reply to Arroyo, Cummiskey, Moland, and Bird-Pollan. In: Metaphilosophy, 2011, 
42/4, pp. 387–394.
3  Hill, T. E. Jr.: Kant on Responsibility for Consequences. In: Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik/Annual 
Review of Law and Ethics, 1994, 2, pp. 159–176; Höffe, O.: Immanuel Kant. Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1994; Murphy, J. G.: Kant: The Philosophy of Right. London & Basingstoke: Mac-
millan, 1970; Reath, A.: Agency and the Imputation of Consequences in Kant’s Ethics. In: Jahrbuch 
für Recht und Ethik/Annual Review of Law and Ethics, 1994, 2, pp. 259–281.
4  Kant, I.: Ethical Philosophy. Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett, 1983.
5  Nizhnikov, S. A.: The Foundation Of Moral Policy: I. Kant, F. Dostoevsky And Others. In: Studia 
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expressed in the form of rules, i.e. in the form of Categorical Imperative.6 
According to Kant, it is only moral action that is consistent with ethical 
principles and it is conducted on the basis of moral motives.7 Despite the fact that 
utilitarianism and Kant differ in how to understand the role and motives of rules 
for assessing moral or right action they can be considered as formal analogous 
approaches since they set strict formal criteria for determining moral or right 
action. It can, therefore, be concluded that an almost identical goal (moving 
towards a perfectionist ideal) is achieved in different ways. It is undoubtedly true 
that the content of Kant’s ethical theory and utilitarianism is substantially different 
because Kant’s ethics is focused on the inner nature of the moral agent’s action 
that understands the action as implementation his/her obligations and the result 
is not primarily important in this context of action. In utilitarianism, however, 
emphasis is placed mainly outside of moral agents, to actions primarily aimed at 
achieving the maximum possible utility or pleasure of their actions. 
The topic of consequences is central to consequentialism in general. That is 
why it is important to be familiar with the opinions of those who dealt primarily 
with consequences from a  non-consequentialist viewpoint, such as Kant. 
When studying this issue, attention should be paid to three areas. Firstly, what 
the true character of Kant’s  ethics is. Secondly, what the position and role of 
consequences in Kant’s ethics are. Thirdly, how the relationship of Kant’s ethics to 
consequentialism is classified. To summarise the first area regarding the character 
of Kant’s ethics: Kant considers accepting a priori moral law (as the initial motif 
for actions) as the criterion which determines the moral character of actions 
and the fulfillment of moral obligation resulting from this law.8 It emphasizes 
the intentional character of Kant’s ethics.9 It, naturally, does not contradict the 
well-known fact that Kant’s ethics also has a significant teleological dimension 
provided by the realm of ends. However, this is a  different aspect of the issue 
which the studied area of Kant’s relationship to consequences is not concerned 
with.
In summary of the second area, i.e. the position and role of consequences 
in Kant’s  ethical theory, it could be said that Kant considers such actions that 
are performed in accordance with requirements resulting from moral obligations 
Philosophica Kantiana, 2012, 1/2, pp. 70–71.
6  Belás, Ľ.: Sociálne dôsledky Kantovej etiky. In: Filozofia, 2005, 60/4, p. 260.
7  Belás, Ľ.: Kant’s ethics as practical philosophy: On philosophy of freedom. In: Ethics & Bioethics 
(in Central Europe), 2017, 7/1–2, pp. 27, 31.
8  Ibid., p. 28.
9  Bendik-Keymer, J. D.: “Goodness itself must change” – Anthroponomy in an age of socially-caused, 
planetary environmental change. In: Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe), 2016, 6/3–4, p. 190; Cico-
vacki, P.: Philosophy as the wisdom of love. In: Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe), 2017, 7/1–2, p. 77.
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as good, regardless the consequences. In the case of different actions, i.e. those 
that are not based on meeting moral obligations but merely on legal obligations 
or even actions contradictory to any obligation, consequences can be taken into 
consideration. Kant regards it important to, in a  measure, note the (especially 
negative) consequences of specific actions by rational beings. In no way does Kant 
consider consequences a criterion of moral actions nor an expression of the moral 
value of a rational being. Furthermore, I will focus especially on the relationship 
between Kant’s ethics (including Kantian ethics) and consequentialist ethics.
Currently, the most important or most known forms of utilitarianism and 
consequentialism that, already in the name, express their positive attitude to 
Kant’s  ethics are Richard M. Hare’s  and David Cummiskey’s  theories. Mostly 
discussion is focused on Hare’s approach expressed in his book Moral Thinking: Its 
Levels, Method and Point (1981), for this reason, I concern Cummiskey’s reasoning 
on the topic following his work Kantian Consequentialism (1996). 
Cummiskey’s Kantian Consequentialism and its Reflections
David Cummiskey in his book refuses to accept the universalization of 
Kant’s inquiry as a starting principle of his theory. He does not derive his affirmations 
from Kant’s  starting points, but his conclusions arising from Kant’s arguments. 
In his view, Kant’s  moral theory justifies a  form of consequentialism without 
debating whether Kant intended to or not.10 Cummiskey called his concept of 
Kantian consequentialism for two reasons: firstly because it is based on Kantian 
internalism and secondly because his value theory is distinctly Kantian.11 His 
theory of good and value is two-tiered, which means that on the one hand 
it accepts the Kantian value of reasonable nature and on the other hand, it is 
completed by the utilitarian requirement of maximizing happiness.12 When 
defining Kantian consequentialism, Cummiskey wrote that 
[r]espect for persons is more important than maximizing happiness. 
This version of consequentialism thus provides a  justification for the 
common view-or at least the Kantian view-that preserving, developing, 
and exercising our rational capacities is more important than maximizing 
happiness. It is simply not acceptable to sacrifice the life or liberty of 
some in order to produce a net increase in the overall happiness. Kantian 
consequentialism is thus a rational reconstruction of the most central and 
influential aspects of Kant’s moral theory.13 
10  Cummiskey, D.: Kantian Consequentialism, ibid., p. 4. 
11  Ibid., pp. 159–160.
12  Ibid., p. 99.
13  Ibid., p. 4.
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Based on these allegations, it can be provisionally concluded that Cummiskey 
pays no attention possible to justify Kantian consequentialism through reflection 
on the place and role of similarity in those consequences within Kant’s  and 
utilitarian or consequentialist ethics.
Nevertheless, it should still pay attention to some aspects of Kantian 
consequentialism which at least indirectly suggest a  link between Kant’s ethics 
and Kantian consequentialism through consequences. Specifically, 
Cummiskey’s  opinion concerning the application of the Formula of humanity 
and the end-in-itself in Kantian consequentialism can be mentioned. Cummiskey 
considers that the central Kantian principle which demands that all persons 
are seen as an end-in-itself and not as a  means generates a  consequentialist 
conclusion. In his view, Kantianism supports consequentialism using Kant’s most 
influential normative principle, the formula of humanity, with an emphasis on 
understanding people as an end-in-itself and not the means.14 
Cummiskey’s view about lies is one of the first examples presenting his approach 
to the acceptance of these values in Kant’s ethics. According to Kant, a lie is in 
no way morally justifiable. Cummiskey argues that “...Kantian consequentialism 
does not require doing anything wrong in order to promote the good. If lying, for 
example, is the best means of promoting the good, then it is not wrong”15. Duty 
to promote the good in his opinion is the Categorical Imperative. While Kant 
thought that lying is the degradation of human dignity, Cummiskey accepts a lie 
if it is a means of doing good. According to Michael Ridge, Kant’s view seems to 
have the consequence that the ideal moral agent is so obsessed with preserving 
the goodness of his/her own will that he/she is unwilling to tell a lie even when 
doing so is necessary to prevent a truly horrible consequence.16
Reasonable nature is the source of all values and then has an absolute value 
that is an estimated idea of morality as a system of the Categorical Imperative. 
Cummiskey says when I am able to be a source of values then I have to accept as 
a source of values any other agents. Thus, any value that is an attribute of me and 
my goals must also attribute to any other agent and his/her objectives. All agents 
have the same practical significance or the same value. Cummiskey calls this 
argument the “equivalence argument”17. The argument in itself contains the idea 
that in the selection, arrangement, and realization of their goals, I am rationally 
obligated to the equal importance of others. An interest in the same status of 
other reasonable entities works as a  regulative requirement for higher order 
14  Ibid., pp. 10–11.
15  Ibid., p. 6.
16  Ridge, M.: Consequentialist Kantianism. In: Philosophical Perspectives, Ethics, 2009, 23, p. 425.
17  Cummiskey, D.: Kantian Consequentialism, ibid., pp. 87–88.
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confirmation and rational arrangement of goals and also as a restrictive condition 
for certain actions. According to him, it further means that the achievement and 
realization of the objectives that I  plan must be consistent with the necessary 
conditions for my rational action as well as rational actions of others. Further, 
the results in the other rational stated objectives must also refer to my own goals. 
Then it seems that in promoting rational entity and happiness we need to be 
strictly impartial and evaluate everything equally.18
The formula of humanity is, according to Cummiskey, a  basic normative 
principle of Kant’s ethics and provides the basis for all moral judgments.19 Each 
agent also has to select goals which would be neutral towards other legitimate 
aims. Equally important is the social context of developing their abilities and the 
provision of reasonable expectations of happiness. Of course, each person has to 
shape and revise their conception of the good within clear limits. There is a social 
obligation to provide the necessary conditions for effective implementation 
of rationally selected goals. Cummiskey affirms that the obligation of mutual 
assistance follows from the general obligation to accept the goals of others as 
their own. This general obligation is, according to Kant, an essential part of the 
idea of humanity as an objective in the end-in-itself.20
We have a duty to promote good, but this obligation is limited to the suitability 
and eligibility of the means by which this can be done. On this basis, Cummiskey 
concluded that in promoting good we must recognize the status of persons other 
than the end-in-itself. In principle, though not in practice, a consequentialist, in 
his opinion, may be requested to sacrifice an innocent person because of some 
greater good. He is aware, however, that according to Kantians, it affirms using 
people as a means and not an end.21 Nevertheless, it submits that fundamental 
structural feature of consequentialism (at least in principle) can ask us to sacrifice 
some people to save others. We must now examine whether the sacrificed person 
is or is not an appropriate feature of understanding the person as an end-in-itself.22 
Consider, Cummiskey writes, what a Kantian must do when faced with the 
terrible choice between killing several people or leaving for dead a  lot more 
people. Take, as an example, a  long-lasting war in which attacks were carried 
out on a city, home of many innocent people (children, the elderly and citizens 
of other countries who are against the war, etc.). We are assuming that our 
actions could significantly reduce human suffering and oppression, could save 
many human lives, then it is not clear why a Kantian could not sacrifice some 
18  Ibid., p. 88.
19  Ibid., p. 106.
20  Ibid., p. 107.
21  Ibid., p. 140.
22  Ibid., p. 141.
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people to save many others. The formula of the end-in-itself asks us not to use 
others as a means of subjective goals. But in this case, in his view, the goals of 
the actions are objective, not subjective. The objective goal is whether it is first 
necessary to protect the lives and freedom that could be lost during the ongoing 
conflict and further support the fundamental needs of others. According to 
Kant’s understanding of the negative obligations, we cannot touch or violate the 
legitimate aims of a person. The positive understanding of obligations means that 
we have a  mission to help people realize legitimate goals.23 Thus, a  conflict of 
duties arises. According to Kant, however, negative obligations are perfect and 
take priority over the positive, which are imperfect. It also claimed that a conflict 
of obligations is not possible because they form a harmonious kingdom of ends.24 
That, according to Cummiskey, suggests that it is not possible to sacrifice a few 
people to save more. On the other hand, however, it points out that the Kantian 
principle of beneficence calls for the rescue of, or help for, so many people, 
however much it is possible to help. Kant is right when he says that we have a duty 
to promote the happiness of others. On this basis, Cummiskey concludes that 
we have additional responsibilities and lexical priority to save lives and promote 
freedom. Duty to promote happiness is a  limited lexical duty to promote the 
conditions necessary for the development of reasonable nature. Deontologists, 
however, contend that this obligation is limited in that they must not be immoral 
conduct, which should be the means of implementing these obligations and 
cannot, therefore, lead to an unreasonable sacrifice. In my opinion, the obligation 
to sacrifice someone and save more is neither immoral conduct nor unreasonable 
sacrificing. In his view, the sacrifice is demanded by reason. This attitude justifies 
the fact that this is consistent with Kant’s requirement of the end-in-itself because 
if it is made good, evil cannot be done. Then Cummiskey notes that to save many 
people cannot be evil.25 
Cummiskey concludes that to sacrifice several people for the rescue of many 
does not use them arbitrarily and does not deny the value of unconditional 
sentient beings. The term end-in-itself, according to him, does not support the 
view that we can never sacrifice someone to save others. If we pay attention to the 
equal value of all sentient beings, then such reasoning leads us to the conclusion 
that the agent can sacrifice a few people to rescue others. However, it also follows 
that there are not acceptable non-rational requirements for sacrificing others.26 
According to Cummiskey, natural interpretation of Kant’s  requirement that to 
23  Ibid.
24  Ibid., p. 142.
25  Ibid., pp. 143–144.
26  Ibid., p. 146.
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each agent is given equal respect for all sentient beings leads to consequentialist 
normative theory. The consequentialist interpretation does not ask victims who 
would be, according to Kantians, considered unreasonable and it does not carry 
out evil, whereas in this case shows the good.27
Even on the basis of extensive analysis of Cummiskey’s views, it is impossible 
to conclude that he somehow accepts consequences as something common to 
consequentialism (really just modified utilitarianism) and Kant’s  ethics. His 
thoughts about consequences is based solely on utilitarian grounds and also 
contains a certain amount of sophisticated speculation to help him prove that, 
on the basis of the conclusions of Kant’s  ethics, utilitarian or consequentialist 
approach to such emergencies can be accepted. The starting point for his efforts 
to reconcile Kant’s  formula of humanity and the end-in-itself with utilitarian 
solutions in the case of deceptive acceptance or sacrificing the life of an innocent 
man is to convince us that everything that is done in order to achieve maximum 
happiness or maximum good is really good. On the one hand, he creates an 
unacceptable precedent because it could lead to the acceptance of unwanted 
forms of behavior and action. On the other hand, thus, he actually got into conflict 
with its own declared lexical priority of protecting, developing and implementing 
rational nature. Even when he used consequences as a  latent criterion when 
considering and deciding in favor of sacrificing innocent people, certainly it has 
been far from the sense in which at least marginally Kant thought of consequences. 
Cummiskey is aware, as well as other utilitarians and consequentialists that 
Kant’s understanding of the consequences is a marginal issue in his ethical theory. 
Almost everyone, Kantians and utilitarians or consequentialists are aware of what 
Jeffrie G. Murphy pointed out that Kant’s  understanding of the consequences 
has nothing to do with how consequences are understood in utilitarianism or 
consequentialism.28
Scott Forschler holds that Cummiskey derives his consequentialist position 
mainly through an argument in favour of the value of rational agency, only later 
he considers how a  rational agent ought to respond to such a value, revealing 
a distinctly un-Kantian priority of the good over the right.29 According to him, 
Cummiskey’s  two-tiered consequentialism privileges the ends of each rational 
agent preserving one’s life and rational capacities above all other ends, requiring 
each agent to always give these ends some significant weight vis-à-vis any other 
ends he or she may have, while still requiring maximization of the satisfaction 
27  Ibid., p. 151.
28  Murphy, J. G.: Kant: The Philosophy of Right, ibid., p. 106.
29  Forschiler, S.: Kantian and Consequentialist Ethics: The Gap can be bridged. In: Metaphilosophy, 
2013, 44/1–2, p. 89.
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of all agents’ ends with this weighting kept in mind.30 Finally, he thinks that it 
is necessary to distinguish between normative and foundational elements of an 
ethical theory. Then, for example, Richard Mervyn Hare, Peter Singer, and George 
Edward Moore are consequentialists, while Immanuel Kant and William D. Ross 
are deontologists. But following meta-ethical criteria, Kant, Hare, and Singer are 
ethical rationalists, while Moore and Ross are intuitionists. He concludes that 
“…[the] utilitarian who starts taking considerations of universality into account 
is on his or her way to Kantianism—but only to Kant’s  rationalism, not to his 
deontology”31. 
According to Philipp Stratton-Lake, Cummiskey holds that there is no 
anti-consequentialist argument in Kant’s  ethics and that there is no Kantian 
argument for the deontological view and there are constraints on maximizing 
the good. In Stratton-Lake’s view, Cummiskey affirms that Kant’s position entails 
consequentialism. He also sees that one of the strengths of Cummiskey’s book 
is the idea of a  consequentialist normative principle justified by Kantian non-
consequentialist arguments. Another value of Cummiskey’s ideas is, in Stratton-
Lake’s opinion, the way he includes the notion of respect for the autonomy of 
others, or the special value and dignity of rational nature, in consequentialism.32
Ridge affirms that these two views, Kantianism, and consequentialism, are 
logically compatible. He thinks that it is possible to agree with Cummiskey 
that Kantian meta-ethics can get you to consequentialism and agree with the 
present account that consequentialism is consistent with Kantian first-order 
moral theory.33 He concludes that consequentialism and Kantianism should not 
be seen as mutually exclusive options. In his opinion, Cummiskey’s  theory is 
Kantian in its verdicts about particular cases and its value theory but nonetheless 
consequentialist in its structure.34
However, Christine M. Korsgaard differently sees relations between 
Kant’s  ethics and consequentialism and she rejects Cummiskey’s  Kantian 
consequentialism. For her, 
consequentialists try to derive the values that concern the quality of our 
relationships from considerations about what does the most good. If 
you should be just and honest and upright in your dealings with others, 
according to the consequentialist, that is because that is what does the 
most good. If you are allowed to be partial to your own friends and family, 
30  Ibid., p. 97.
31  Ibid., p. 100.
32  Straton-Lake, P.: Recent Work: Kant’s Moral Philosophy. In: Philosophical Books, 1999, 40, pp. 
215–216.
33  Ridge, M.: Consequentialist Kantianism, ibid., p. 423.
34  Ibid., p. 435.
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and not required always to measure their interests against the good of 
the whole, that is because it turns out, the consequentialist claims, that 
people maximize the good of the whole more efficiently by attending to 
the welfare of their own friends and family. It is less often noticed, but 
just as true, that in a Kantian theory the value of producing the good is 
derived from considerations about the quality of our relationships. The 
reason that pursuing the good of others is a duty at all in Kant’s theory is 
that it is a mark of respect for the humanity of another that you help him 
out when he is in need, and more generally that you help him to promote 
his own chosen ends when you are in a position to do that. This is why 
it is a  serious mistake to characterize Kantian deontology as accepting 
a “side-constraint” on the promotion of the good. Kant does not believe 
there is some general duty to maximize or even promote the good that is 
then limited by certain deontological restrictions. Rather, he believes that 
promoting the good of another and treating her justly and honestly are 
two aspects of respecting her as an end in herself.35
Conclusion
Those utilitarian or consequentialist theories which, in some way, declare an 
adherence to Kant’s  ethics do not provide any confirmation either that it is in 
consequences where common features of these conceptions with Kant can be 
found. Then, the result of the research is that Kant only pays scant regard to the 
consequences of actions by rational beings, and that is at the level of legal actions 
based on hypothetical imperative. Kant’s understanding of consequences, their 
position, and role in his ethical theory does not provide any reason to claim 
that there is a  similarity between Kant and utilitarianism or consequentialism 
concerning issues regarding consequences. Kantians, utilitarians as well as 
consequentialists are aware of this.
In the context of an ethical position entitled ethics of social consequences as 
a  form of non-utilitarian consequentialism36, I  think that there are similarities 
35  Korsgaard, Ch. M.: Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason, ibid., pp. 
388–389.
36  Gluchman, V.: Etika sociálnych dôsledkov – jej princípy a hodnoty. In: Filozofia, 1996, 51/12, pp. 
821–829; Gluchman, V.: Etika utilitarizmu a neutilitaristický konzekvencializmus. In: Filosofický 
časopis, 1996, 44/1, pp. 123–132; Gluchman, V.: Hodnotová štruktúra neutilitaristického konzekven-
cializmu (Pettitova a Senova koncepcia hodnôt). In: Filozofia, 1999, 54/7, pp. 483–494. Gluchman, V.: 
Ľudská dôstojnosť a neutilitaristická konzekvencialistická etika sociálnych dôsledkov. In: Filozofia, 
2004, 59/7, pp. 502–507. Gluchman, V.: G. E. Moore and theory of moral/right action in ethics of 
social consequences. In: Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe), 2017, 7/1–2, pp. 57–65; Kalajtzidis, 
J.: Ethics of social consequences as a contemporary consequentialist theory. In: Ethics & Bioethics 
(in Central Europe), 2013, 3/3–4, s. 159–171; Kalajtzidis, J.: Ethics of social consequences and ethical 
issues of consumption. In: Human Affairs, 2017, 27/2, pp. 166–177; Komenská, K.: Bioetické reflexie 
pohrôm a katastrof – nové výzvy pre súčasnú etiku. In: Filosofický časopis, 2016, 64/5, pp. 767–768; 
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between consequentialism and Kant’s ethics. It especially concerns his formula 
of humanity and an approach to humanity as one of the most important values 
of ethics of social consequences. In this position, humanity is understood as all 
the forms of behavior leading to the protection and maintenance, i.e. respect 
and development of human life. On the basis of the differences in the objects 
of our behavior and conduct, we distinguish between humanity as primary 
natural-biological quality (fundamental the moral value of respect to human 
life) and additional moral quality (in some contexts it can be a virtuous action) 
supporting and developing the human life of strangers.37 The moral value of the 
first kind of behavior is determined by our biological or social relations to our 
close ones. In the second case, the moral value of our behavior to strangers is 
a pure manifestation of our morality and I think that it is also fully acceptable in 
Kant’s seeing humanity overcoming our nature and moral hindrances. 
On the other hand, the protection and maintenance of the life of strangers 
is a  moral additional value (perhaps, a  virtuous action) by which we create 
a new, higher quality in our behavior in relation to other people. In this case, we 
can really speak about humanity as a moral quality or value in Kant’s sense. It 
is something that is really specifically human and which deserves respect and 
admiration. By such behavior man proves that he can, at least to a certain extent, 
transcend the natural-biological framework of his determination. Especially in 
that context, it is very close to Kant’s ideas on the extension of the moral realm to 
strange people.38 
In conclusion, we can find similarities between consequentialism and 
Kant’s  ethics, particularly in practical terms. It concerns the fundamental 
values inherent in Kant’s ethics and ethics of social consequences in which the 
value of humanity holds a  position of one of the core values. Despite the fact 
that Kant does not directly regard consequences in his theory in a  significant 
way, Cummiskey’s  considerations of humanity, as well as the ethics of social 
consequences, offer us the possibility that there is a scope for finding common 
approaches in solving moral problems between Kantians and at least some 
versions of consequentialism, including ethics of social consequences concerning 
especially humanity.
Švaňa, L.: War, terrorism, justice and the ethics of social consequences. In: Ethics & Bioethics (in 
Central Europe), 2015, 5/3–4, pp. 211–225; Švaňa, L.: On two modern hybrid forms of consequen-
tialism. In: Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe), 2016, 6/3–4, pp. 157–166. 
37  Gluchman, V.: Miesto humánnosti v etike sociálnych dôsledkov. In: Filozofia, 2005, 60/8, pp. 
613–623.
38  Gluchman, V.: Kant and Virtuous Action: A Case of Humanity. In: Palmquist, S. (ed.): Cultivating 
Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010, pp. 256–264. 
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Summary
Kant and Consequentialism (Reflections on Cummiskey’s  Kantian 
Consequentialism)
In his article, the author considers possible forms of relationship between 
Kant’s  ethics and consequentialism. In this context, he analyses David 
Cummiskey’s views which are expressed in his book, Kantian Consequentialism 
(1996). He demonstrates the possibility of justifying the consequentialism on 
the basis of Kant’s  ethics and its values. Likewise, several other authors (such 
as Scott Forschler, Philipp Stratton-Lake, Michael Ridge) are of the opinion of 
the possible compatibility of Kant’s  ethics and consequentialism. On the other 
hand, however, Christine M. Korsgaard is an example of a strict rejection of the 
similarity between Kant and the consequentialist ethics. The author based on 
the ethics of social consequences as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism 
claims (like Cummiskey), that there are similarities between Kant’s  ethics 
and consequentialism. Unlike Cummiskey, however, he sees similarity in the 
Kant’s formula of humanity and the understanding of humanity in ethics of social 
consequences, especially in the form of additional moral value.  
Key words: Cummiskey, Kant, consequentialism, humanity, ethics of social 
consequences
Zhrnutie
Kant a  konzekvencializmus (Úvahy o  Cummiskeyho práci Kantian 
Consequentialism)
Autor sa vo svojom príspevku zamýšľa nad možnými podobami vzťahu medzi 
Kantovou etikou a  konzekvencializmom. V  tejto súvislosti analyzuje názory 
Davida Cummiskeyho vyjadrené v jeho knihe Kantian Consequentialism (1996). 
Cummiskey dokazuje možnosť zdôvodnenia konzekvencializmu na základe 
Kantovej etiky a jej hodnôt. Podobne aj viacerí ďalší autori (napríklad Scott Forschler, 
Philipp Stratton-Lake, Michael Ridge) zastávajú názor o  možnej kompatibilite 
Kantovej etiky a  konzekvencializmu. Avšak na druhej strane Christine M. 
Korsgaard je príkladom striktného odmietania podobnosti medzi Kantovou 
a  konzekvencialistickou etikou. Autor na základe etiky sociálnych dôsledkov 
ako formy neutilitaristického konzekvencializmu (podobne ako Cummiskey) 
tvrdí, že existujú podobnosti medzi Kantovou etikou a konzekvencializmom. Na 
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rozdiel od Cummiskeyho však vidí podobnosť predovšetkým v rámci Kantovej 
formuly humánnosti a chápania humánnosti v etike sociálnych dôsledkov, a to 
najmä v podobe dodatočnej morálnej hodnoty. 
Kľúčové slová: Cummiskey, Kant, konzekvencializmus, humánnosť, etika 
sociálnych dôsledkov
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